

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

10 December 1958

25X1

Copy No. C 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. *2*
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. *X*
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: *TS*
NEXT REVIEW DATE: *2020*
AUTH: *4480*
DATE: *4-4-80* REVIEWER:

25X1

25X1

State Dept. review completed

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 December 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


OK
USSR-Berlin: Ambassador Thompson believes the USSR probably has a number of "fallback positions" on Berlin and is planning further moves over the next six months to maintain its initiative on the problem. The USSR may offer to include East Berlin in a demilitarized free city.

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X6



70
Afghanistan: Afghan Prime Minister Daud's recent expressions of strong concern over US military negotiations with Pakistan and Iran and over developments in Pakistan indicate Kabul feels increasingly isolated and may be reassessing its foreign policy. The Afghan Government may feel compelled to draw closer to the USSR, although its first efforts might be to try to secure more support from the West.

25X1



25X6

25X1

25X1

OK

France-Guinea: De Gaulle, who has previously refused to recognize Guinea, has authorized signature of a financial agreement which includes a clause stating that France recognizes the Toure government. This action will remove one of the major obstacles to better French-Guinea relations and may have the effect of countering the trend toward close association between Guinea and Ghana.

25X1

25X1

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR May Offer to Include East Berlin in Free City

Ambassador Thompson believes Moscow probably has further moves and various "fallback positions" on Berlin planned for use over the next six months. Thompson suggests that an offer to include East Berlin in a demilitarized free city might be advanced to make the original Soviet proposal more attractive.

The Soviet leaders probably foresee major advantages from any Western response. Acceptance would require the withdrawal of Western garrisons, and negotiations for a UN-controlled access corridor to Berlin which would amount to a large measure of international recognition of the East German regime. Rejection by the West, in Moscow's view, would greatly strengthen the Soviet position for carrying out the previously announced plans to transfer control over Allied access to West Berlin to the East Germans. The Soviet leaders probably also expect that a negative Western reaction would stimulate fresh demands by opposition parties, particularly in West Germany and Britain, for various disengagement schemes which would lead to the demilitarization and neutralization of a reunified Germany.

Recent hints by Soviet diplomats in Moscow and various European capitals and a speech by East German Premier Grotewohl suggest that the USSR plans further initiatives linking its Berlin proposals to broader German and European questions.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Afghan Government May Be Reassessing Its Foreign Policy

The Afghan Government apparently feels increasingly isolated as a result of recent events in the Middle East and may be reassessing its foreign policy. Since the Iraqi coup of 14 July, the Afghan royal family has been nervous about its ability to remain in power.

Prime Minister Daud has expressed strong fears that US military negotiations with Pakistan and Iran are "shattering" the balance of power in the area and causing an economic drain on other countries which must arm themselves. Daud is also apparently worried by the advent of a new military regime in Pakistan. His government is discouraged over prospects of making progress toward an accommodation in its "Pushtoonistan" dispute with Pakistan, which it feels has a vital bearing on its prestige and power within Afghanistan.

If Kabul's anxieties continue, it may consider that it has no alternative but to accept Soviet support in maintaining its position. It might accordingly accept an enlarged Soviet military training program and emphasize its long-standing defense agreement with the USSR.

Daud, however, resented Voroshilov's attacks against the West during his state visit in early October, and his government resisted Soviet suggestions of a pact with the UAR. Aware of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Finland, the Afghans have appeared cautious about drawing closer to the USSR. Apprehension about possible Soviet pressure may make Kabul particularly sensitive to real or imagined dangers of isolation from the free world.

Kabul therefore may first maneuver to secure Western pressure on the new Pakistani regime to adopt a more conciliatory position on Pushtoonistan, and it may want Western assurances that Pakistan and Iran are not to be further strengthened at the expense of Afghan security. The Afghans are also likely to seek to speed up American economic assistance programs.

25X1

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

25X1

France-Guinea Accord Authorized by Paris

De Gaulle has authorized signature of a monetary agreement with Guinea which includes a clause stating that France recognizes the government of Premier Sekou Toure. The French negotiator of the agreement says it provides for Guinea's continuing membership in the franc zone and for creation in Guinea of an exchange office, a treasury, a state bank of issue, and a national currency. Texts of a cultural accord and a technical assistance agreement are also reported ready for signature.

French approval of these measures is a reversal of the policy followed by Paris since Guinea chose independence by rejecting De Gaulle's new constitution. It removes one of the major obstacles to better relations between Guinea and France, and also to regularization of future contacts between Guinea and the French African territories which have elected to participate in the new French Community.

France probably intended its abstention in the 9 December vote on Guinea's UN admission to show that, despite the new agreement, French support for former territories which choose independence will be less complete than for those which stay with the French Community.

Toure now may be less disposed to push for the close association with Ghana which he and Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah projected on 23 November. He has had some indication that he might be less than an equal partner in a Guinea-Ghana association, and may have developed second thoughts about becoming involved with Britain through Ghana's Commonwealth ties.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200070001-7

TOP SECRET